Copyright 2012 by Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University Law Review

Printed in U.S.A.
Vol. 106, No. 1

“JEALOUSIES OF A STANDING ARMY”: THE USE OF
MERCENARIES IN THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
CONGRESS’S ROLE IN REGULATING PRIVATE
MILITARY FIRMS
Matthew Underwood
ABSTRACT—The use of mercenaries during the American Revolution
should inform the debate over the regulation of private military firms
(PMFs) today. This Comment examines the historical use of mercenaries to
demonstrate that a standing army, in the experience and understanding of
the Framers, included both enlisted citizens and private enterprises who
performed a wide range of essential military functions. It further argues that
PMFs as they currently function in Iraq and Afghanistan fall squarely
within the Framers’ broad conception of a standing army. The debates
about national defense following the American Revolution show that the
Framers accepted a standing army in the new nation solely on the condition
that it be regulated and controlled by Congress. However, PMFs are
currently governed as civilians by the terms of their contracts with the
Executive Branch. This arrangement has led to a number of serious
problems, including widespread waste and fraud resulting from deficient
oversight, lack of accountability for brutal human rights violations, and
distortion of the democratic decisionmaking process. This Comment argues
that treating PMFs as civilians for the purposes of regulation is misguided,
both as a constitutional and practical matter. Congress must exert control
over PMFs using the same system that governs the military, in accordance
with the separation of powers over national defense established at the
framing.
AUTHOR—J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2012;
B.A., Tulane University, 2000. I would like to thank Professor Joseph
Margulies for his advice and feedback in developing this project, as well as
the members of the orthwestern University Law Review for their editorial
work. Thanks to my family for their love and support.

317

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 318
I.

II.

MILITARY PRACTICE AT THE TIME OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION...................... 321
A.

Background: Early European Experience with Mercenaries ...................... 321

B.

Armies in the American Revolution ............................................................. 323

C.

The Debates About Standing Armies in America ........................................ 326

D.

Congress’s Authority over the Armed Forces ............................................. 331

THE MODERN PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM ............................................................... 332
A.

Role in Contemporary American Foreign Policy ........................................ 332

B.

ot Quite Civilians, ot Quite Soldiers ...................................................... 335

C.

Flaws in the Current System ....................................................................... 339

III. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM ....................................................................................... 346
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 349

INTRODUCTION
On August 31, 2010, President Obama announced the end of combat
operations in Iraq.1 In the eighteen months preceding the announcement,
nearly 100,000 troops returned home.2 But the withdrawal of troops did not
necessarily mean a reduction in U.S. military presence.3 A surge of private
military firms (PMFs)4 arrived in Iraq as U.S. troops departed.5 The United
States would maintain its military hegemony in Iraq beyond the end of
combat operations, but it would exercise authority through the use of
private military companies rather than American troops.
A deep ambivalence has accompanied the use of PMFs in Iraq and
Afghanistan.6 As a presidential candidate in February 2008, Hillary Clinton
sharply criticized military contractors, referring to them as mercenaries and
sponsoring legislation to ban them.7 As Secretary of State in July 2010,

1
Helene Cooper & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Declares an End to Iraq Combat Mission, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2010, at A1.
2
See Alexander Cockburn, o, the Empire Doesn’t Always Win, NATION, Aug. 30/Sept. 6, 2010, at
9, 9.
3
See id.
4
PMFs are also commonly called PMCs (private military companies). PSC (private security
company) refers to the subset of PMFs that provide protective services.
5
See Jeremy Scahill, Iraq Withdrawal? Obama and Clinton Expanding US Paramilitary Force in
Iraq, NATION (July 22, 2010, 10:59 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/37877/iraq-withdrawalobama-and-clinton-expanding-us-paramilitary-force-iraq.
6
See, e.g., Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 995, 1004 (2005) (calling the
prospect of unaccountable private military contractors both “disturbing” and “inconsistent with growing
demands for compliance with human rights globally,” but acknowledging that “[i]mmediate benefits are
clear”).
7
Scahill, supra note 5.
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however, in the midst of the troop withdrawal from Iraq, she asked
Congress to approve funding to double the number of PMFs working in
Iraq under the authority of the State Department.8
Condemning the use of PMFs when politically expedient and then
employing them when convenient is not a new phenomenon in American
history. One of the complaints lodged against King George in the
Declaration of Independence was that “[h]e is at this time transporting large
Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation
and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy
scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the
Head of a civilized nation.”9 Nevertheless, during the Revolution, American
military leaders actively sought the aid of mercenaries to support their
fledgling army of enlisted men.10 It would have been odd for them to do
otherwise: the use of mercenaries was the norm in European warfare at that
time.11
The use of mercenaries during the American Revolution should inform
the debate over the regulation of PMFs today. This Comment examines the
historical use of mercenaries to demonstrate that a standing army, in the
experience and understanding of the Framers, included both enlisted
citizens and private enterprises who performed a wide range of essential
military functions. It further argues that PMFs as they currently function in
Iraq and Afghanistan fall squarely within the Framers’ broad conception of
a standing army. The debates about national defense following the
Revolution show that the Framers accepted a standing army in the new
nation solely on the condition that it be regulated and controlled by
Congress. If PMFs fall within the Framers’ conception of a standing army,
then Congress has a responsibility under the Constitution to regulate them
as part of the military.12
8

Id.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 27 (U.S. 1776).
10
See DANIEL MARSTON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1774–1783, at 20 (2002). For example, the
American army during the Revolution employed European officers with expertise in military
technology, paid Native Americans to fight with them against the British, and sometimes even competed
directly with King George for the services of the Hessian mercenaries that the authors of the Declaration
so vehemently deplored. See infra Part I.B.2.
11
See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY
28–34 (updated ed. 2008). By the seventeenth century, “European armies . . . often were simple
amalgamations of hired mercenary companies, all with their own specialties.” Id. at 28.
12
The word “mercenary” is imbued with negative connotations, and its meaning varies substantially
according to context. Because the comparison between mercenaries at the time of the Revolution and
PMFs today is central to the argument of this Comment, it may be helpful to briefly address the
ambiguity of the term and distinguish between its various meanings. In the context of historical
scholarship, the broad concept of mercenary encompasses many types of military professionals. See,
e.g., Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private
Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2003) (explaining that mercenaries could be “lone
adventurer[s]” who fought for the highest bidder, elite guards of heads of state, and “free companies” of
9
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PMFs are currently governed as civilians by the terms of their contracts
with the Executive Branch.13 This arrangement has led to a number of
serious problems, including widespread waste and fraud as a result of
deficient oversight, lack of accountability for brutal human rights
violations, and distortion of the democratic decisionmaking process.14 This
Comment argues that treating PMFs as civilians for the purposes of
regulation is misguided, both as a constitutional and as a practical matter.
Congress must exert control over PMFs using the same system that governs
the military, in accordance with the separation of powers over national
defense established at the framing.
Part I examines the use of mercenaries in European militaries and the
Continental Army during the American Revolution, and then examines how
the military experience and political background of the Framers shaped the
debates that led to the standing army provisions of the Constitution. Part II
analyzes the current system of military contracting and some of the
problems associated with that system. Part III argues that the most effective
way to address problems in the current system involves bringing contractors
under congressional military regulation. This Comment suggests regulatory
changes consisting of three major components: (1) integration of PMFs into
the military chain of command, (2) extension of the jurisdiction of courts
martial over PMFs, and (3) strengthening of oversight by improving
private armies who sold their services to feudal lords). In modern international law, the term mercenary
has a narrowly defined meaning and its application to a particular group has specific legal consequences.
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 47, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 25. Modern
PMFs are adamant that the Geneva Convention definition does not apply to them, and many scholars
agree. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
However, it is not just the legal implications of the term that trouble PMFs. The word mercenary has
long carried a derogatory connotation. Even at the time of the Constitution’s framing, when mercenaries
were widely employed, the word mercenary was often used to mean untrustworthy, self-serving, or
motivated solely by financial gain. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 397
(Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott, eds. 1920) (“If men will not serve in the Legislature without a
prospect of such offices, our situation is deplorable indeed. If our best Citizens are actuated by such
mercenary views, we had better chuse a single despot at once.”). In this derogatory context, the term is
often merely a tool of political rhetoric, and it carries no specific legal or historical meaning. See SARAH
PERCY, MERCENARIES: THE HISTORY OF A NORM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 50–51 (2007) (“The
word mercenary has evolved into a pejorative term used to denote a disliked soldier. The proscription
against mercenary use is so strong that the word mercenary itself has become a powerful political
tool . . . .”). For the purposes of this Comment, the comparison of modern PMFs to their seventeenthand eighteenth-century European counterparts—whom historians call mercenaries—does not imply that
PMFs are mercenaries as defined by current international law. Neither does this Comment use the word
in its derogatory sense. Instead, it seeks to show that the Framers understood standing armies to include
a number of different private military enterprises as well as enlisted citizen soldiers.
13
See Deborah Avant, Mercenaries, FOREIGN POL’Y, July–Aug. 2004, at 20, 22 (“In the United
States . . . the Federal Acquisition Regulations and additional Department of Defense rules govern
contracts with private [military] firms.”).
14
See infra Part II.C.
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Congress’s access to information about PMFs. All three suggestions can be
accomplished either through legislation or control over the military budget.
The historical analysis in this Comment establishes that Congress has
the power, under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,15 to regulate PMFs
as part of the military. Thus far, Congress has failed to exercise this power.
Congress’s failure represents an abdication of its proper role in the
constitutional system of separation of powers over the military. As the
Framers well understood, the “parchment barriers” in the constitutional text
are insufficient to maintain the correct balance of power among the
branches of the federal government.16 Rather, each branch must protect its
own institutional authority.17 Congress must exert control over PMFs in
order to reestablish the proper separation of powers over the military.
I.

MILITARY PRACTICE AT THE TIME OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Part I reviews the use of mercenaries in medieval and early modern
Europe to establish the historical context for their use during the American
Revolution. Then it examines the British and American practice of
employing mercenaries during the Revolution and shows how this practice
shaped political debate on both sides of the Atlantic.
A. Background: Early European Experience with Mercenaries
The use of mercenaries in Europe grew out of shortcomings in the
medieval feudal system.18 In the feudal system, each social class owed
military service to the class above it for a short period each year, leaving
rulers with unspecialized forces on call for a limited time.19 It became
common for lords to pay for the services of private military companies
composed of individuals who specialized in a particular skill.20 Over time,
these private military companies developed into well-organized and
lucrative businesses. For example, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,
professional infantry units and royal guards in Switzerland became

15

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To raise and support Armies . . . .”).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 305 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“Will it be
sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments in the constitution of the
government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power? . . . But
experience assures us that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated . . . .”).
17
See id. NO. 51, at 318 (James Madison) (“In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and
distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all
hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will
of its own . . . .”); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“[O]nly Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.”).
18
See SINGER, supra note 11, at 22.
19
See id.
20
Id. Artillerymen, for instance, formed an international trade guild with its own patron saint and
zealously guarded trade secrets. Id.
16
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industries that operated on an international scale.21 Contemporaneously in
Italy, the condottiere system (from condotta, meaning “contract”)
formalized business relationships between mercenary captains and the cities
that hired them for protection.22
The rise of mercenary forces sometimes posed a grave danger to the
social order, as when unemployed mercenaries ravaged the French
countryside after the Hundred Years’ War demanding that towns and cities
pay them protection money.23 To resolve the tension between the usefulness
of mercenaries in times of war and the inherent danger they posed in times
of peace, states began to bring them under control by subjecting them to
legal restrictions and incorporating them into more permanent military
institutions.24 Thus, in the fifteenth century, the Swiss government devised
strict contracts for its mercenary companies, and Charles VII of France
organized mercenaries into compagnies d’ordonnance, a “prototype
standing army.”25
The gradual professionalization of European militaries reached a peak
during the Thirty Years’ War, which lasted from 1618 to 1648.26 In that
conflict, which marked a “heyday for hired armies,”27 the majority of
soldiers who fought and died were mercenaries.28 The Peace of Westphalia
that ended the Thirty Years’ War marked the beginning of the long
transition from the use of mercenaries to the use of national armies.29 That
treaty solidified the emergence of nation-states with exclusive sovereignty
over affairs within their borders.30 This new political reality provided the
context in which standing armies, composed entirely of enlisted citizens,
replaced private military enterprises as the new norm.31
The phase-out of private military enterprises after the Thirty Years’
War was very gradual, however, and nations continued to employ
mercenaries well into the nineteenth century.32 It was not until 1871, when
21

Id. at 27.
See PERCY, supra note 12, at 75.
23
Id. at 78.
24
See id. at 78–93.
25
Id. at 82–84.
26
Christopher H. Lytton, Blood for Hire: How the War in Iraq Has Reinvented the World’s Second
Oldest Profession, 8 OR. REV. INT’L L. 307, 314 (2006).
27
Id. (quoting P.W. Singer, The Ultimate Entrepreneur, MIL. HIST. Q., Spring 2003, at 6, 8)
(internal quotation mark omitted).
28
Id. at 314–15.
29
See SINGER, supra note 11, at 29.
30
Id.
31
See Janice E. Thomson, State Practices, International orms, and the Decline of Mercenarism,
34 INT’L STUD. Q. 23, 43 (1990) (“Two factors were crucial to the decline of mercenarism and other
forms of nonstate violence: the transformation of the state into the nation-state and the rise of the
citizen.”).
32
See SINGER, supra note 11, at 32.
22
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“Prussia’s victory in the Franco-Prussian War demonstrated the superiority
of a citizen-army” over professional military companies, that every major
state in Europe began relying on their own citizens for national defense.33
The American Revolution, which began in April of 1775, occurred in the
middle of this long period of transition. When the founding generation built
the framework for a new nation, the emerging ideal of the citizen soldier
was taking hold, but the paid mercenary remained a staple of armed
conflict.
B. Armies in the American Revolution
1. Britain’s Use of Mercenaries.—When the American Revolution
began in 1775, Britain did not have enough troops to defeat the American
forces and maintain control over its worldwide empire.34 That year, the
British Army stood at about 48,000 officers and men, distributed
throughout North America, Ireland, Great Britain, Minorca, Gibraltar,
Africa, and the West Indies.35 Eight thousand of these—far too few to
contain the insurrection—were stationed in North America.36 Attempts to
enlist more Englishmen into the regular army failed.37 The problem of
insufficient troops intensified when France and Spain entered the conflict
and sided with the colonies.38
Under these circumstances, the decision to hire mercenaries was a
natural British response.39 They hired roughly 10,000 Native Americans
from the Iroquois and Algonquin nations to serve as scouts and raiders.40
They also turned to the professional armies of the German principalities and
33

See Thomson, supra note 31, at 32.
See SINGER, supra note 11, at 33.
35
See MARSTON, supra note 10, at 17.
36
Id.
37
See PERCY, supra note 12, at 152. For example, in 1778 Britain added 1000 Englishmen to the
ranks of the army by imposing a parish quota, but they deserted en masse at the first opportunity. Id.
One historian offers a broad explanation for the lack of military enthusiasm:
Modern nationalism not yet having appeared, and the emotions of Europe’s religious wars having
burned themselves out, the European populations at large were divorced from interest in the
political goals of their monarchs. . . . To have enlisted huge numbers of men into their armies
would have been difficult, since most of their subjects were indifferent to the purposes of their
wars.
RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 19 (enlarged ed. 1984). More
specifically, in the context of the American Revolution the British may have faced difficulties raising
troops because the war against the colonies was controversial. See PERCY, supra note 12, at 153 (noting
the Duke of Chandos’s observation that British troops were reluctant “to engage against their fellowcitizens”).
38
See MARSTON, supra note 10, at 17.
39
See PERCY, supra note 12, at 149 (“By the time the American Revolution began, there was no
question that Britain would send foreign troops as part of its army, because foreigners had always been
used in the past.”).
40
See MARSTON, supra note 10, at 19.
34
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ultimately hired nearly 30,000 German mercenaries.41 The decision to use
mercenaries may have followed the prevailing norm, but it met with dissent
from some English political leaders, who challenged the hiring of German
troops on both moral and pragmatic grounds.42 This criticism reflects a
broader trend: the emerging belief that citizen armies were superior to
mercenaries.43
The use of mercenaries against English subjects particularly disturbed
critics.44 Such resistance had very deep roots in English history. As long ago
as 1215, rebellious barons forced King John to banish mercenary soldiers
“who have come with horses and arms, to the kingdom’s hurt.”45 In the
aftermath of the English Civil War, which lasted from 1642 to 1651, fear of
standing armies prompted the revival of the militia system, a regime in
which local citizen volunteers enforced domestic security.46 Consistent with
the preference for local militias, the Bill of Rights that emerged from the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 forbid the “raising and keeping [of] a Standing
Army within this Kingdome in time of Peace without Consent of
Parlyament . . . .”47 There can be little doubt that the standing armies
addressed in this document were widely understood to include mercenaries;
the English army in Flanders in the 1690s was nearly half mercenary, and
that number rose in the following decade.48 Generally, it appears that the
British did not have a problem with mercenaries per se, but rather with the
Crown’s use of mercenaries at home against English subjects. The
preference for local militias over standing armies at home would inform the
American constitutional debates a century later.49
2. America’s Use of Mercenaries.—In 1775, most of Washington’s
soldiers went home in December upon the expiration of their enlistments.50
Washington reorganized the army on January 1, 1776, but not enough men
41
See SINGER, supra note 11, at 33. Because approximately two-thirds were from the Hesse-Kassel
region, the German forces became known as “Hessians” by the Americans. Id.
42
See PERCY, supra note 12, at 152–55. For instance, some argued that mercenarism was akin to
slavery; others pointed out that the presence of foreign troops would solidify American resistance. See
id.
43
Id. at 149–52.
44
Id. at 153 (quoting Mr. Alderman Bull, who exhorted, “[L]et not the historian be obliged to say
that the Russian and the German slave was hired to subdue the sons of Englishmen and of freedom”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
45
A. E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 18, 48 (revised ed. 1998).
46
See Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the
Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 968–970 (1975).
47
An Act Declareing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Setleing the Succession of the
Crowne (Bill of Rights), 1688, 1 W. & M., c.2 (Eng.).
48
PERCY, supra note 12, at 149.
49
See infra Part I.C.
50
Holly A. Mayer, The Continental Army, in A COMPANION TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 308,
309 (Jack P. Greene & J.R. Pole eds., paperback ed. 2004).
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volunteered, and none of the regiments were at full strength for the 1776
campaign.51 The personnel problem continued throughout the war,52 but
Congress and the military command attempted to combat it in part by hiring
mercenaries.53
Although the number of paid foreign troops fighting for the Americans
was always lower than the number of Hessian mercenaries on the British
side, the Continental Army did employ foreign corps to ameliorate their
manpower shortage.54 They also competed with the British for the services
of the Native Americans and Hessians. For instance, Ethan Allen, the
Colonel Commandant of the Vermont militias, sent a message to the
Caughnawagas in Canada, urging them that the British king was in the
wrong and offering to give them “Money Blankets Tomehawks Knives and
Paint and the Like as much as you say” if the Caughnawagas would join
Allen’s troops.55 After the Hessians arrived at Staten Island, Congress
formed a committee to devise plans for encouraging them to defect to the
American side56 and periodically distributed leaflets offering them land and
livestock in exchange for their service.57
In addition to facing a troop shortage, the continental army lacked
expertise in key areas.58 The Americans addressed this problem by engaging
the professional services of European military officers.59 According to one
historian, this practice became so widespread that Congress “seemed to be
dispensing commissions wholesale to foreign adventurers.”60 Washington
felt obliged to remind Congress that a background of service in a foreign
army was not a guarantee of competence, but he too recognized the army’s
51

Id.
Id.
53
See MARSTON, supra note 10, at 20.
54
See id. The foreign corps included “Pulaski’s Legion, Von Heer’s Provost Corps and BrigadierGeneral Charles Tuffin Armand’s Independent Chasseurs.” Id.
55
BARBARA GRAYMONT, THE IROQUOIS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 68 (1972) (quoting a
message from Ethan Allen of Vermont).
56
See CHARLES PATRICK NEIMEYER, AMERICA GOES TO WAR: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
CONTINENTAL ARMY 52 (1996).
57
EDWARD J. LOWELL, THE HESSIANS AND OTHER GERMAN AUXILIARIES OF GREAT BRITAIN IN
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 286 (Heritage Books 2008). One 1778 proclamation promised “fifty acres
of land to every soldier that will come over, and any captain who brings forty men with him shall
receive eight hundred acres of woodland, four oxen, one bull, two cows, and four sows.” Id.
58
See WEIGLEY, supra note 37, at 64–65 (“Washington continued to lack officers sufficiently
versed in combat tactics and experienced in the stress of combat to make the right decisions consistently
and promptly . . . .”).
59
See id.
60
Id. at 65; see also Aram Bakshian, Foreign Adventurers in the American Revolution, 21 HIST.
TODAY 187, 187 (1971) (noting the efforts of Silas Deane and Benjamin Franklin to recruit professional
officers from Europe and describing the “swarms of adventurers of many nationalities [who] repaired to
America uninvited, presenting themselves to a Congress that gradually grew weary of the seemingly
endless supply of martial counts, barons, and marquises, many of them self-ennobled.”).
52
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necessities.61 His engineering corps was adequate only because he hired
foreign military professionals with the necessary expertise,62 and he
received valuable help from foreign officials in a number of areas that were
vital to the American campaign.63 With the help of contributions by foreign
military professionals, by 1781 Washington’s forces became a small
standing army based on the model of eighteenth-century European
militaries.64
Given both their own experience building the American army and their
familiarity with European practice at the time of the Revolution, it is
reasonable to infer that the Framers and other well-informed citizens
understood that a standing army included a wide range of military
professionals beyond the enlisted citizen.
C. The Debates About Standing Armies in America
The debates over the use of standing armies in America during the
Revolution and its aftermath reveal a deep tension between the value of
liberty and the demands of security.65 The terms of the debate drew heavily
on the competing views of radical and moderate Whigs in seventeenth-

61

See WEIGLEY, supra note 37, at 65.
Id. at 70. For example, Polish engineer Tadeusz Kosciuszko contributed to the defensive works at
Saratoga, and French military engineers led by Louis Duportail helped assemble a set of portable
bridges, design the fortress at West Point, and establish three companies of combat engineers to train
Americans. See id; Robert K. Wright, Jr., “ or Is Their Standing Army To Be Despised”: The
Emergence of the Continental Army as a Military Institution, in ARMS AND INDEPENDENCE: THE
MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 50, 61–62 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert
eds., 1984).
63
For example, he relied on the Prussian officer Friedrich Wilhelm Baron von Steuben to develop a
system of drill regulations and tactics for his army. See Wright, supra note 62, at 69–70. Baron von
Steuben personally trained a company of officers and dispatched them to transmit his ideas throughout
the Continental Army. See WEIGLEY, supra note 37, at 64. He also established the office of inspector
general, which strengthened Washington’s control of the army and “gradually eliminated the need for
most existing administrative officials.” See Wright, supra note 62, at 71.
64
See Wright, supra note 62, at 72.
65
It may be helpful at this point to address an ambiguity in the term “standing army.” On one hand,
“standing” implies permanent, as opposed to an army raised in the midst of war and then disbanded in
times of peace. However, in eighteenth-century debates and correspondence, the term standing army did
not always mean permanent. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress
(Sept. 2, 1776), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 4, 5 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1932)
(“[O]ur Liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, If not entirely lost, If their defence is left to any
but a permanent standing Army, I mean one to exist during the War.”). Instead, a standing army refers to
an army of full-time professional soldiers, as opposed to a militia composed of volunteer citizens serving
part-time. In this sense, a standing army is permanent because it serves for the duration of the war. As
discussed above, the early manpower shortages of the Continental Army were caused in part by the need
to reenlist soldiers every year. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. A standing army could
solve this problem without necessarily continuing beyond the duration of the war. The distinction
between a professional standing army, which included mercenaries, and a volunteer militia, which did
not, informed the debate during the Revolutionary Era.
62
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century England.66 Radical Whigs associated standing armies with
mercenaries, which they in turn associated with the king’s arbitrary
exercises of power.67 By contrast, they believed that a militia of citizen
soldiers “stood at the heart of the stable and balanced constitution.”68
Moderate Whigs, on the other hand, argued that standing armies were both
necessary and compatible with the survival of a free society, as long as “the
safety of the realm required it and Parliament consented.”69 Both of these
visions found expression in the debates over standing armies in America
before, during, and after the Revolution.
In the years immediately preceding the Revolution, radical Whig
rhetoric decrying the British army’s depravity in the colonies was an
important part of the discourse driving America toward revolution.70 In the
midst of the war, however, exigencies that required the skill of military
professionals brought American views more in line with moderate Whig
acceptance of standing armies,71 in part because the militia proved
unreliable as the war progressed.72 In the battles of Long Island, Kip’s Bay,
and White Plains during the summer and fall campaign of 1776, the militia
“[threw] down its weapons and [ran] away in the face of the enemy.”73
Washington’s frustration with the militia became apparent in a letter to the
Continental Congress:
To place any dependance upon Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken
staff. Men just dragged from the tender Scenes of domestick life;
unaccustomed to the din of Arms; totally unacquainted with every kind of
Military skill, which being followed by a want of confidence in themselves,

66

See LAWRENCE DELBERT CRESS, CITIZENS IN ARMS: THE ARMY AND THE MILITIA IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY TO THE WAR OF 1812, at 34 (1982) (“Certainly the competing English arguments over the
nature of military institutions and their impact on civil society touched the consciousness of the
colonists.”). Radical and moderate Whigs were two competing groups of political theorists in
eighteenth-century England. See id. at 15–18. The radical Whigs considered themselves heirs to classical
republican thought and developed a historical critique that purported to explain the decline of English
liberty. See id. at 15–17. To the radical Whigs, the emergence of standing armies out of the old feudal
order was a sign of society’s increasing decadence and corruption. Id. at 17. Moderate Whigs rejected
the classical republican model and took a more positive view of historical progress. Id. at 15. In their
view, military professionalism was just one manifestation of the specialization that was critical to the
operation of modern society, and therefore acceptable. See id. at 15–16.
67
See id. at 18.
68
Id. at 16.
69
Id. at 25–26.
70
Id. at 53; E. Wayne Carp, The Problem of ational Defense in the Early American Republic, in
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: ITS CHARACTER AND LIMITS 14, 21 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1987)
(“Americans’ denunciations of standing armies became commonplace after British regulars arrived in
Boston in 1768.”).
71
See CRESS, supra note 66, at 53.
72
See Carp, supra note 70, at 24 (“The much vaunted militia, reputedly composed of virtuous
farmers who fought selflessly for the commonwealth, evaporated in the face of prolonged conflict.”).
73
Id.
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when opposed to Troops regularly train’d, disciplined, and appointed, superior
in knowledge, and superior in Arms, makes them timid, and ready to fly from
their own shadows. . . .
....
The Jealousies of a standing Army, and the Evils to be apprehended from
one, are remote; . . . but the consequence of wanting one . . . is certain, and
inevitable Ruin . . . .74

Largely as a result of Washington’s distrust of the militias, he built a
standing army that included mercenaries.75
The tension between the standing army’s utility and its potential to
endanger liberty drove the postwar debate as well. During the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the ratification debates that
followed, the Framers considered whether the new nation should rely
primarily on militias or on a standing army for the national defense, and
views differed on how each sort of military unit should be managed.76
Opponents of the standing army, such as Eldridge Gerry and Luther Martin,
feared that there would be no check on its power and proposed that
restrictions be written into the Constitution to limit both the size of the army
and the amount of revenue that Congress could appropriate to support it.77
The Federalists, who favored the standing army, argued that such
restrictions would be shortsighted because “[t]he circumstances that
endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the
care of it is committed.”78 Echoing Washington’s concerns during the war,
the Federalists also maintained that a militia would prove ineffective
against a professional European army: “The steady operations of war
against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted
by a force of the same kind.”79
Yet even the Federalist James Madison feared that a powerful standing
army controlled by the Executive might endanger liberty. He argued in the
Constitutional Convention debates that “[a] standing military force, with an
overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty.”80 These
fears were also repeatedly expressed by the Antifederalists, who revived

74
Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Sept. 24, 1776), in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 65, at 106, 110, 112.
75
See supra Part I.B.2.
76
See Gary L. Hoffman, Court-Martial Jurisdiction and the Constitution: An Historical and
Textual Analysis, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 43, 91–94 (1987).
77
Id. at 92.
78
THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 16, at 149 (Alexander Hamilton).
79
Id. NO. 25, at 162 (Alexander Hamilton).
80
James Madison, Friday June 29th in Convention, in 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 461, 465 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
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radical Whig arguments against standing armies in the hands of an
ambitious Executive and exalted state-controlled militias as “the bulwark of
a free people.”81
The Framers answered this problem by granting Congress broad
powers over the military.82 The Federalists argued that frequent elections
and the tension between opposing parties in Congress would keep the
Legislative Branch responsive to public concerns over the danger of a large
standing army. Hamilton explained:
As often as the question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and
attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition . . . .
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community require time to
mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace those
liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations; which would
suppose not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and
executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that
such a combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be
persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive variations in a
representative body, which biennial elections would naturally produce in both
houses? . . . If such presumptions can fairly be made, there ought to be at once
an end of all delegated authority.83

Thus, the acceptance of a standing army in the new constitutional system
depended on legislative control.
Considering that mercenaries figure prominently in the Declaration of
Independence, it is perhaps curious that the debates over standing armies in
the Constitutional Convention do not specifically mention them. Perhaps
the Framers, who constantly used the word “mercenary” in its derogatory
sense in their political rhetoric against the British,84 did not want the word
associated with their own military institutions. Yet there can be little doubt
that at the time of this debate, they understood mercenaries to be part of a
standing army. Besides the fact that both sides used mercenaries during the
war, the association between mercenaries and standing armies was
prevalent in the political debates taking place outside of the convention.
81
Weatherup, supra note 46, at 986 (quoting Letter from John De Witt to the Free Citizens of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, AM. HERALD (Boston), Dec. 3, 1787); accord Speeches of Patrick
Henry (June 5 and 7, 1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 199, 214 (Ralph Ketcham, ed. 2003)
(“The army will salute him Monarch; your militia will leave you and assist in making him King, and
fight against you: And what have you to oppose this force?”).
82
THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, supra note 16, at 166 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[W]hen they referred the
exercise of that power [over the military] to the judgment of the legislature, they had arrived at the
ultimate point of precaution which was reconcilable with the safety of the community.”).
83
Id. at 167–68.
84
For instance, in General Orders dated January 1, 1777, George Washington wrote, “[I]t is
expected that humanity and tenderness to women and children will distinguish brave Americans,
contending for liberty, from infamous mercenary ravagers, whether British or Hessians.” THE WRITINGS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 65, at 466.
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Speakers at the time seemed to treat “mercenary” and “standing army”
as interchangeable terms; at the very least, they presumed the inclusion of
mercenaries in the term “standing army.” In a pre-Revolution town hall
meeting in Boston, for example, one citizen who protested the quartering of
soldiers explicitly equated standing armies with mercenaries and opposed
them to the ideal of citizen militias: “Standing Armies have forever made
Shipwreck of Free States and no People Jealous of their liberties ever
patiently suffered Mercenary Troops to be quarter’d & maintained within
their Populous Cities; the Militia of the Colony are its best and natural
defense[.]”85 Similarly, the Virginia Convention drafted a resolution stating
that “a Militia in this Colony would for ever render it unnecessary for the
Mother Country to keep among us, for the purpose of our defence, any
Standing Army of mercenary forces, always subversive of the quiet, and
dangerous to the liberties of the people.”86 The pseudonymous writer
Caractacus, in the pamphlet On Standing Armies, referred to standing
armies as mercenaries even while acknowledging that they were necessary
under certain circumstances:
I shall only mention one political evil to which there is too great a propensity
in the American Colonies, and that is, a willingness to trust the defence of our
country to mercenary troops. I would not be understood here to insinuate the
least reflection upon our brave countrymen who are now encamped around
Boston: a mercenary army was absolutely necessary in that place, as the militia
of that country were unequal to the toil and expense of besieging and watching
the motions of our enemies.87

Mercenaries’ ubiquity in armies during the American Revolution, as
well as their prevalence as a topic of political debate, demonstrates that the
Framers and other well-informed citizens at the time understood that
standing armies were not limited to enlisted citizens. The fact that the
Framers nevertheless provided for the limited use of a standing army in the
Constitution shows that they accepted that the nation’s military resources
could include military professionals other than the citizen soldier. However,
they were only willing to make this provision on the condition that
Congress have broad power over the military. The next section examines
the extent of Congress’s power over the armed forces.

85
A REPORT OF THE RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON CONTAINING THE BOSTON
TOWN RECORDS, 1770 THROUGH 1777, at 133 (Boston, Rockwell & Churchill 1887).
86
Petition and Memorial of the Assembly of Jamaica (Mar. 23, 1775), in 2 AMERICAN ARCHIVES,
FOURTH SERIES 167 (Peter Force ed., Washington, D.C. 1837), available at http://lincoln.lib.niu.edu/cgibin/amarch/getdoc.pl?/var/lib/philologic/databases/amarch/.2178.
87
Caractatus On Standing Armies (Aug. 21, 1775), in 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, FOURTH SERIES 219
(Peter Force ed., Washington, D.C. 1837), available at http://lincoln.lib.niu.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/
getobject.pl?c.6216:1.amarch.
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D. Congress’s Authority over the Armed Forces
The Constitution’s provisions for a standing army reflect a compromise
between radical Whig idealism and moderate Whig pragmatism.88 The
Founders’ fear of a standing army, like that of the English theorists a
century earlier,89 was rooted in the danger that such an army would pose in
the hands of an unchecked Executive.90 The solution was to divide power
over the standing army between the Executive and the Legislature.91 The
Constitution granted Congress the power to “raise and support Armies” and
“[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces,” but limited that power by requiring that “no Appropriation of
Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years.”92 With this
authority, Congress can “check any propensity of the President for selfaggrandizement and tyranny” by preventing “the establishment or
continuation of a [permanent] standing army in times of peace.”93
These provisions amount to a very broad grant of power to Congress.
No restrictions other than the two-year limit on appropriations bind that
body’s ability to raise armies.94 Congress is not limited to raising an army in
times of war, as some in the Constitutional debates proposed,95 but may do
so in times of peace in order to be prepared for the eventuality of war.96
Furthermore, the language makes it clear that Congress’s power to raise an
army is exclusive.97 The Executive has no power to raise a private army or
navy in the absence of congressional authorization.98
Congress’s power to regulate the armed forces it raises is similarly
extensive. It is empowered to impose rules on the internal governance of the
88
CRESS, supra note 66, at 53 (“Americans developed during the Revolutionary War a
constitutional and institutional structure that reflected both a sensitivity to radical Whig suspicions of the
military in society and a recognition that military expertise was essential for the preservation of
republican institutions.”).
89
See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
90
See David I. Lewittes, Constitutional Separation of War Powers: Protecting Public and Private
Liberty, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1083, 1136 (1992).
91
See id. at 1137.
92
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 14.
93
Lewittes, supra note 90, at 1137–38; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, supra note 16, at 167
(Alexander Hamilton) (“[Legislatures] are not at liberty to vest in the executive department permanent
funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so
improper a confidence.”).
94
Lewittes, supra note 90, at 1143.
95
See Hoffman, supra note 76, at 92.
96
See Lewittes, supra note 90, at 1142; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, supra note 16, at 161
(Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that prohibiting the raising of a standing army in times of peace would
create “a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defense before it was actually invaded.”).
97
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, supra note 16, at 154 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he whole power
of raising armies was lodged in the legislature, not in the executive . . . .”).
98
See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War and Military
Powers, 87 TEX. L. REV. 299, 324 (2008).
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military and on the structure of chains of command by legislating
hierarchical promotional guidelines and organizing units around civilian
and military leaders whose appointments require Senate confirmation.99 The
first Congress enacted rules covering “training and tactics, the positioning
of assets, the use of military force, and the treatment of prisoners”100
Congress alone has the power to create a separate system of military
justice,101 which includes setting disciplinary guidelines and authorizing
penalties for violations.102 Finally, Congress has extensive oversight
functions: it subjects military policy to scrutiny and accountability by
requiring written reports and holding oversight hearings.103
Despite the vast potential for Congress to exercise dominion over the
United States’ standing army, it has not exercised its authority over the
armed forces to control PMFs operating with the U.S. military in Iraq and
Afghanistan.104 The remainder of this Comment examines the use of PMFs
today and argues that Congress must regulate them as part of the military.
II. THE MODERN PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM
A. Role in Contemporary American Foreign Policy
If mercenaries were the norm during the American Revolution, why
does the use of PMFs today generate such heated debate? Two explanations
seem likely. First, there was a global change in norms: mercenaries became
less acceptable after the Thirty Years’ War and were generally entirely
eliminated from national armies after the Franco–Prussian War ended in
1871.105 Thus, mercenaries have been generally unacceptable for over a
century, and the recent emergence of PMFs challenges a prevailing
international norm.106 Second, for most of its history, the United States was

99

See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic
Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1055–56 (2004).
100
Prakash, supra note 98, at 332–33; see also Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 4, 1 Stat. 95, 96.
101
Prakash, supra note 98, at 329.
102
See, e.g., Resolution of November 28, 1775, in 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
1774–1789, at 378, 381 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1905) (prohibiting desertion and the
destruction of enemy papers).
103
See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 99, at 1065–66. For a sense of the scale of congressional military
oversight activity in modern times, see Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of
Civilian Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 379 (1994) (“Congress annually
makes 750,000 inquiries of the Pentagon and demands 750 yearly reports. Furthermore, the Congress
created potent support agencies like the General Accounting Office (GAO), a huge 5,000 person
investigatory organization that frequently targets the military.” (footnote omitted)).
104
See infra Part II.C.1.
105
See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
106
See PERCY, supra note 12, at 121–22, 216–17 (explaining the shift away from mercenary use in
the 19th century as a change in norms and discussing the criticism of PMFs in the context of the
international norm against mercenaries).
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not in a state of permanent military mobilization around the globe as it has
been since World War II.107 Professional military companies became
necessary only as U.S. military power expanded beyond the capacity of an
all-volunteer army.108 Seen in that context, the controversy over PMFs arises
out of a larger debate over the proper role of American military power and
its relationship to democratic institutions.109
The aftermath of the Cold War created the conditions necessary for the
reemergence of military privatization.110 The downsizing of major military
efforts at the end of the Cold War created a global surplus of individuals
with military training. Those individuals marketed their services to
governments around the world that were hoping to save costs and improve
the efficiency of their defense programs.111 In the United States, the trend of
military privatization began under the administrations of George H.W. Bush
and Bill Clinton, both of whom embraced it as a means of scaling back the
military at the end of the Cold War.112
Privatization escalated dramatically after 9/11.113 Even before the
regular military arrived, private contractors accompanied the special forces
that hit the ground first in Afghanistan.114 Before the war in Iraq started, the
Army announced that it would permit contractors to compete for 154,910
civilian jobs and 58,727 military positions, including interrogators, guards
for U.S. military bases, and other functions traditionally performed
exclusively by enlisted military personnel.115 PMFs became the secondlargest military force in Iraq after the U.S. military.116
Currently, the Executive Branch manages PMFs through contractual
relationships.117 Within the Department of Defense (DOD), “the office of
the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Program Support) is

107
See generally Christopher A. Preble, The Founders, Executive Power, and Military Intervention,
30 PACE L. REV. 688 (2010) (describing the transition from limited military engagements in the United
States’ first century to the permanent military institution of today).
108
See infra notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
109
See infra note 128.
110
Minow, supra note 6, at 997.
111
See id.
112
See id. at 1001–03 (“The Pentagon delivered $300 billion worth of contracts to private military
industries between 1992 and 2002.”).
113
Rebecca Ulam Weiner, Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2006, at 23, 23,
available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2006/argument_weiner_janfeb06.msp
(“In the Persian Gulf war of 1991, the ratio of soldiers to contractors was 50 to 1. In the current Iraqi
conflict, it is 10 to 1 and falling.”).
114
See Minow, supra note 6, at 1003.
115
See id.
116
See id. at 996.
117
See JENNIFER K. ELSEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32419, PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 6 (2008).
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responsible for all contractor oversight . . . .”118 In some cases, contracts are
routed through the Commerce, Interior, or State Departments and are
managed independently by officials in those departments.119
One military officer’s rationale for privatization echoes the same
concerns that led military commanders in the American Revolution to seek
help from military professionals: “When you run out of soldiers and they
don’t have an expertise, one way to get that capability on the battlefield is
to contract it.”120 It is certainly true that PMFs provide significant benefits to
the military. They offer a “surge capability” in situations where it would be
ineffective to expand the military to meet “extraordinary but time-limited
need[s].”121 Contractors also often have technological expertise that the
government cannot quickly duplicate, such as expertise in the operation of
complex weapons systems.122 By employing contractors, “the military can
obtain the newest technology and the staffs trained to maintain it—and even
avoid the costs of retraining simply by shifting to a new team.”123 In
conflicts such as the one in Iraq, where contractors often employ locals,
privatization also provides a cultural and linguistic advantage.124
In fact, it simply might not be possible to implement the current
foreign policy of the United States without contractors.125 Maintaining a
network of over 700 military bases around the globe126 and a long-term
occupation of two countries is very likely beyond the capacity of an allvolunteer army.127 Private contractors will probably remain a part of the

118

Id.
Michaels, supra note 99, at 1067.
120
Minow, supra note 6, at 1003 (quoting Major Gary Tallman, an Army spokesman) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
121
ELSEA ET AL., supra note 117, at 35.
122
Scott M. Sullivan, Private Force/Public Goods, 42 CONN. L. REV. 853, 881–82 (2010). For
instance, the military often hires contractors to operate complex weapons systems. Id.
123
Minow, supra note 6, at 1004.
124
ELSEA ET AL., supra note 117, at 36.
125
Id. (“Without private contractors, the U.S. military would not have sufficient capabilities to carry
out an operation of the scale of Iraq, according to many analysts.”); see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–03–695, MILITARY OPERATIONS: CONTRACTORS PROVIDE VITAL
SERVICES TO DEPLOYED FORCES BUT ARE NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED IN DOD PLANS 2 (2003)
(“DOD uses contractors to provide U.S. forces that are deployed overseas with a wide variety of services
because of force limitations and a lack of needed skills.”).
126
CHALMERS JOHNSON, NEMESIS: THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 5 (2006) (“[W]e
now station over half a million U.S. troops, spies, contractors, dependents, and others on more than 737
military bases spread around . . . more than 130 countries . . . .”).
127
See Kateryna L. Rakowsky, Note, Military Contractors and Civil Liability: Use of the
Government Contractor Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 365, 370 (2006) (“Experts widely recognize that ‘without contractors, our military simply
cannot project its awesome technical superiority abroad.’” (quoting Steven L. Schooner, Contractor
Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549, 554 (2005)). Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England testified before
119
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American military absent a wholesale change in the way the nation
organizes and uses its armed forces.128
ot Quite Civilians, ot Quite Soldiers129
Throughout the Cold War and its aftermath, the military maintained a
distinction between civilian contractors and enlisted soldiers by separating
the types of work they performed.130 In contemporary military conflicts such
as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the line separating civilian
contractor work from military work has essentially disappeared.131 Until
recently, the concept of “inherently governmental functions” defined those
governmental activities that could not be privatized.132 Congress codified
this concept in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 as a
“function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to require
performance by Federal Government employees.”133 In the military context,
combat is the paradigmatic “inherently governmental” function from which
contractors have been excluded.134
However, the PMFs and the government have not adhered to this rule
in practice. PMF employees in Iraq and Afghanistan have repeatedly
engaged in combat. On March 31, 2004, four employees of the PMF
B.

Congress in 2008 that “contractors are vital in an all-volunteer military force.” Sullivan, supra note 122,
at 881 (internal quotation marks omitted).
128
Cf. Sullivan, supra note 122, at 881–82 (arguing that both external technology-forcing factors
and domestic policy choices have made it unlikely that the military will be able to reverse the trend of
privatization). For instance, Scott Sullivan points out that we could return to a policy of mass
conscription, but such a change would meet massive political opposition. Id. at 882. Alternately, we
could significantly scale back our military: for a thorough argument that “a massive military and an
interventionist foreign policy” is unnecessary, departs from what the Founders envisioned, and creates
“a persistent imbalance between the different branches of government,” see Preble, supra note 107, at
689.
129
P. W. Singer, Outsourcing War, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 119, 126 (“Contractors are
not quite civilians, given that they often carry and use weapons, interrogate prisoners, load bombs, and
fulfill other critical military roles. Yet they are not quite soldiers, either.”).
130
See Michaels, supra note 99, at 1013 (“Throughout much of the Cold War era, defense
‘privatization’ mainly involved the federal government purchasing weapons and hardware from the
private sector and contracting out some clerical, custodial, and other support functions.”).
131
See id. at 1018–20.
132
See ELSEA ET AL., supra note 117, at 32.
133
Pub. L. No. 105-270, § 5(2)(A), 112 Stat. 2382, 2384 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 501).
134
See Michaels, supra note 99, at 1018–20; Nelson D. Schwartz, The Pentagon’s Private Army,
FORTUNE, Mar. 17, 2003, at 102 (explaining the principle that outsourcing noncombat tasks enables the
military “to focus on its core competency: fighting”). For example, the DOD published a rule in 2006
explaining that “[i]t is the responsibility of the [military official overseeing the contract] to ensure that
private security contract mission statements do not authorize the performance of any inherently
Governmental military functions, such as preemptive attacks, or any other types of attacks.” 71 Fed.
Reg. 34,826–27 (June 16, 2006) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 212, 225, 252).
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Blackwater were attacked while guarding a convoy in Fallujah.135 Just a
week later, when Iraqi militia forces attacked U.S. headquarters in Najaf,
eight Blackwater employees held them off, and Blackwater sent in its own
helicopters as backup.136
PMFs’ combat activities are not limited to defensive or protective
services.137 In May 2004, employees of DynCorp helped raid Ahmed
Chalabi’s personal compound as well as his offices at the Iraqi National
Congress in Baghdad.138 The following September, federal agents
investigated Blackwater for the apparently unprovoked killing of seventeen
civilians in Nisour Square, Baghdad.139
Rather than drawing a clear distinction between contractors and the
military based on roles in combat, the Executive Branch has responded to
situations like those described above by blurring the line further.140
Contractors are now allowed to “use deadly force when such force
reasonably appears necessary to execute their security mission”141
Furthermore, courts have begun extending immunity from civil suit to
contractors in recognition of the role they play in combat.142 For example,
the Government Contractor Defense (GCD) is a judicially created
affirmative defense that applies certain provisions of the Federal Tort
Claims Act to military contractors.143 Since the 1980s, it has protected
contractors involved in the manufacture or design of military equipment
from product liability suits under certain circumstances.144 Recent litigation
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David Barstow, Security Firm Says Its Workers Were Lured into Iraqi Ambush, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 2004, at A1.
136
Dana Priest, Private Guards Repel Attack on U.S. Headquarters, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2004, at
A1.
137
See Zoe Salzman, Note, Private Military Contractors and the Taint of a Mercenary Reputation,
40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 853, 883 (2008).
138
See Michaels, supra note 99, at 1033.
139
David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1.
140
See, e.g., Joshua S. Press, Crying Havoc over the Outsourcing of Soldiers and Democracy’s
Slipping Grip on the Dogs of War, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 109, 114 (2008) (“Indeed, the
Department of Defense changed its policies in March 2008 to authorize private soldiers’ direct
participation in hostilities rather than for self-defense alone.”).
141
48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7040(b)(3)(ii) (2008).
142
See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2005); see also Trevor
Wilson, Note, Operation Contractor Shield: Extending the Government Contractor Defense in
Recognition of Modern Warfare Realities, 83 TUL. L. REV. 255, 277 (2008) (discussing Ibrahim’s
analysis of PMCs as de facto soldiers “actually taking part in the military effort in an active role”).
143
Rakowsky, supra note 127, at 377. The Supreme Court first articulated the GCD in Yearsley v.
W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
144
See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(articulating a three-part test to determine the applicability of the GCD: (1) whether government
specifications existed for the product, (2) whether the manufacturer met the specifications, and (3)
whether the government “knew as much or more than the defendant about the hazards” created by the
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has expanded this doctrine to cover contractors who take part in combat.145
In Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., the court decided the GCD would shield the
defendants if they “were essentially soldiers in all but name.”146 Thus, the
law now recognizes that, in some cases, no real distinction exists between
the role of the military and its contractors.
The methods of modern warfare muddy the distinction between PMFs
and the military even further.147 Weapons technology has stretched the
modern battlefield to proportions unimaginable a century ago.148 A soldier
sitting in front of a computer screen far removed from the point of conflict
can fire a missile at enemies thousands of miles away.149 Very often, civilian
contractors maintain and operate these remote weapons systems.150 When
battles are fought with such complex technological systems, the law of war
does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes direct participation in
combat.151
Thus, in practice, the distinction between the military and the PMFs
they hire has collapsed. This is not simply a result of the particular roles
PMFs play in combat but also a function of contractors’ ubiquity. They
have assumed such a broad range of roles that the U.S. military would have
a hard time functioning without them.152 Contractors work in war zones as
“communication specialists, intelligence operatives, target selectors,
surveillance pilots, armed security and peacekeeping agents, hostage
rescuers, interrogators, and weapon systems operators.”153 They serve as
strategic planners and military advisors in the field and in the Pentagon, and
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as Reserve Officers’ Training Corps instructors across the United States.154
In some cases, companies are tied so closely to Pentagon operations that
they essentially assign contracts to themselves.155 For example, KBR won
its Iraq contract based on its ability to meet the U.S. Army’s contingency
plan for rebuilding Iraq, a plan KBR itself prepared as part of an earlier
contract.156 One commentator noted that contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan
do “‘what citizens consider the stuff of government: planning, policy
writing, budgeting, intelligence gathering, nation building,’ but under the
employment relationship of a temporary worker.”157
In sum, modern PMFs are full-scale military companies that have been
functionally integrated into the U.S. Armed Forces. As such, they are
precisely analogous to the private military companies operating in Europe
and America at the time of the American Revolution and the centuries
preceding it.158 Like Washington’s foreign corps of engineers, they provide
expertise and logistical support that allow the military to take advantage of
the latest technology. Like Prussian officer Baron von Stueban,159 they help
develop and implement military policy. Like Pulaski’s Legion,160 they put
soldiers in the field.
As shown in Part I, the Framers understood standing armies to include
a broad range of military professionals beyond the enlisted citizen. The
Framers nevertheless agreed to provide for a standing army for the nation’s
defense, but only on the condition that it be regulated by Congress. This
Part has shown thus far that modern PMFs are military professionals who
are so closely integrated with the regular military that it would very likely
be impossible to implement current U.S. defense policy without them. As
such, they fit squarely within the Framers’ broad understanding of a
standing army. Therefore, the regulation of PMFs is exclusively the
province of Congress. Yet under the current system, executive departments
assume control of PMFs and manage them through contractual relationships

154
Id. The head of DynCorp, one of the largest military companies in the United States, has
claimed, “You could fight without us, but it would be difficult . . . . Because we’re so involved, it’s
difficult to extricate us from the process.” Deven R. Desai, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: A Proposal
for a Layered Approach to Regulating Private Military Companies, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 825, 834 (2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
155
See Desai, supra note 154, at 834.
156
Id.
157
Minow, supra note 6, at 1003–04 (footnote omitted) (quoting Dan Guttman, The Shadow
Pentagon, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 24, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://www.iwatchnews.org/2004/09/
24/6623/shadow-pentagon).
158
See, e.g., Avant, supra note 13, at 20 (“Modern contractors most resemble the military
enterprisers of the late Middle Ages.”); Milliard, supra note 12, at 8 (“[Modern private military
companies’] corporate model can be traced to Harold Hardraade’s Norse mercenaries, first offered in
support of the Byzantine Empire in 1032.”).
159
See supra note 63.
160
See supra note 54.

338

106:317 (2012)

“Jealousies of a Standing Army”

as civilians. This arrangement violates constitutional separation of powers
by giving authority to the Executive that belongs to Congress.
The remainder of this Part will examine some of the problems that
have arisen under the current system. First it will look specifically at the
systemic imbalances the current system creates in the constitutional scheme
of separation of powers over the military. Next it will look at some of the
practical problems of effective management that have arisen, including
widespread waste and fraud, confusion in the chain of command, and a lack
of accountability in the courts for crimes committed by PMFs. The systemic
constitutional problems demonstrate why Congress must fulfill its proper
role in regulating PMFs, while the practical problems suggest the shape that
congressional regulation should take. Accordingly, Part III will suggest a
proposal for reform.
C. Flaws in the Current System
The current system of regulating and managing PMFs is deeply flawed
in three key areas.
First, the system distorts the balance of power between Congress and
the Executive because PMFs have become a substantial private military
force entirely under the control of the Executive. Thus, although Congress’s
authority over the armed forces was designed to serve as a check on
executive power, the use of PMFs permits the Executive to exercise plenary
power over a broad range of military operations. Second, the current system
lacks sufficient oversight to ensure contractual compliance and to establish
a clear chain of command on the battlefield. Third, the system lacks
adequate accountability for criminal behavior by PMFs because their
employees often do not fall under any court’s jurisdiction.
1. PMFs and the Separation of Powers.—The current system of
military contracting poses a threat to the system of checks and balances that
the Framers carefully crafted to avoid vesting the Executive with excessive
unilateral power over the military.161 As discussed earlier, the Framers were
adamantly opposed to placing unchecked military power in the hands of the
Executive.162 Therefore, the Constitution unambiguously separated
command of the military163 from regulation of the military164 in order to
prevent a tyrannical aggrandizement of executive war powers.165 Military
contracting subverts Congress’s regulation of the military in numerous
161
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ways, which in turn prevents Congress from acting as a check on executive
power.
Congress can constrain a hawkish president by limiting the number of
troops available to him. But by providing an external, elastic source of
troops, PMFs allow the Executive to exercise military power where
congressional opposition would otherwise prevent it.166 During the Balkan
conflict in the 1990s, for example, the Clinton Administration wanted to
provide military support to the Croats (and later the Bosnian Muslims) to
counter Serbian aggression.167 Committing American troops was not
possible, however, in the face of congressional opposition (as well as
numerous other obstacles, including an U.N. arms embargo and hesitant
international allies).168 Clinton therefore turned to PMFs to accomplish his
goals without the political opposition he would have faced had he sent
American troops.169 This situation shows how PMFs provide the Executive
with an independent source of military power that allows him to circumvent
the check of congressional authority over the armed forces.
Congress’s power of the purse—another tool it can use to constrain the
use of the military—can also be circumvented through creative funding for
military contracts.170 In Iraq, for example, contractors were paid, in part,
directly from revenue generated by Iraqi oil sales rather than from revenue
from the U.S. federal budget.171 Under these circumstances, Congress’s
ability to influence military policy through funding is nonexistent.
Contractors bypass congressional control in other ways as well. For
example, while Congress traditionally exercises influence through Senate
confirmation of military officers, the use of contractors nullifies the
Senate’s role in deciding who will implement military policy.172 And
contracting limits Congress’s role in authorizing the use of force: because
the War Powers Resolution applies only to the deployment of U.S. Armed
Forces and anti-covert operations legislation requiring congressional
notification and consultation applies only to U.S. intelligence officers,173 the
Executive can avoid the requirements of these statutes by using
contractors.174
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A fundamental problem underlying Congress’s failure to regulate
PMFs is the extent to which PMFs and the Executive have successfully
avoided sharing information with Congress. As noted earlier, Congress
scrutinizes military policy by demanding written reports and holding
oversight hearings.175 However, PMFs routinely resist congressional
inquiries by claiming the need to protect proprietary information.176
Additionally, the Executive has often failed to keep sufficient records or has
simply refused to present basic, accurate information.177 The Executive also
evades congressional scrutiny of PMFs by arranging for the companies to
contract directly with third-party nations or host countries.178 Congress’s
failure to gather information about PMFs means that very basic questions—
such as how many contractors are currently employed, exactly which
companies are involved, and how much taxpayers spend for their services—
remain unanswered.179 Without such information, Congress cannot possibly
regulate PMFs effectively.
A crucial unanswered question is why Congress has failed to insist that
PMFs and the Executive share information. It seems that Congress simply
lacks the political will to address the issue. This brings the discussion back
to a much broader point made earlier180: Congress bears the responsibility to
protect and maintain its institutional role in the constitutional system of
separation of powers. In other words, if it is a violation of separation of
powers that the Executive currently controls PMFs, then Congress
ultimately bears the responsibility for not asserting control.
Congress’s failure to assume control of PMFs has consequences for the
democratic decisionmaking process. As Hamilton explained in Federalist
No. 26, Congress acts as a check on executive exercise of military power
largely because it was designed to be more responsive to the will of the
electorate.181 When the President uses PMFs to enable military engagements
without the knowledge or consent of Congress, it is impossible for
congressional leaders to represent their constituencies on the issue. The
electorate tends to be very sensitive to American casualties, for example.182
This is unsurprising, as the burden of military engagement falls primarily
on the American public, not their elected officials.183 Contractor
175
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deployments are not counted among official troop levels, however, and
contractor deaths are not counted among official casualties.184 In this way,
the true costs of war in blood and treasure remain hidden from public view.
2. Lack of Oversight.—Turning now from systemic constitutional
problems to more practical problems of effective management, it is clear
that there are serious flaws in the oversight of PMF operations. In other
words, not only is the Executive doing Congress’s job, it is doing the job
incompetently. Oversight of PMFs in Iraq and Afghanistan is grossly
deficient in two key respects: contractual compliance and chain of
command in the field.
Numerous reports have found that failures of contractual compliance
enforcement are “pervasive and basic.”185 A 2004 report from the Office of
the Inspector General on coalition contracts in Iraq found missing and
incomplete records, as well as an inadequate system for contract review,
tracking, and monitoring.186 In many instances, as a result of an insufficient
number of adequately trained staff,187 the contracting department had no
representative on site where the contractor was operating.188
Further complicating the problem, the DOD often hires private
companies to monitor other companies’ contracts.189 For example, Aegis, a
private security company, serves as a “coordinating hub” for more than fifty
private security companies in Iraq and oversees a $293 million contract.190
In other cases, there are layers of subcontracting that obscure oversight.191
The failure to enforce contractual compliance contributes to
widespread waste, fraud, and abuse because the government cannot hold
contractors accountable for mistakes and overbilling if it lacks basic
information.192 A 2003 GAO report found that there had been $49 billion in
errors by the DOD’s billing agency in the previous year, which cost $34
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million to correct.193 In another instance, a Halliburton employee testified
that when the company subcontracted jobs to companies who in turn
subcontracted, “[w]e, essentially, lost control of the project and paid
between four to nine times what we needed to fund that project.”194 Despite
these types of problems, the government has rarely suspended or otherwise
disciplined contractors for misconduct, overcharging, and other
violations.195
A second oversight problem arises when military commanders lack a
command-and-control relationship with contractors.196 A GAO official
testified before Congress in 2006 that private security contractors did not
coordinate with the military when they entered the “battle space” in Iraq.197
As a result, it is often unclear how military commanders should “secure
cooperation from contractors to promote order in the theater of
operations.”198 At the Abu Ghraib prison, for example, military personnel
did not receive guidance about how to use contracted personnel and did not
receive information about the terms and procedures specified in the
contract.199 Several people reported situations in which contractors held
authority over military personnel.200 As a result, there was confusion
regarding “the appropriate relationship between contractor personnel,
government civilian employees, and military personnel.”201
This confusion raises a serious concern. Without a clear chain of
command, contractors may fail to do their jobs at critical moments,
endangering lives and thwarting American objectives.202 This problem
existed even in those decades when contractors provided purely commercial
or ministerial, as opposed to military, services.203 In 1976, during an
outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, DOD contractors left en
masse and the military officers could not order them to stay.204 Desertion
creates an even greater risk now that contractors are indispensable to the
193
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execution of combat operations. As Colonel Steven Zamparelli, the Director
of Contracting for the Air Force, has pointed out, “[T]oday, [such a
desertion during battle] could mean the only people a field commander has
to accomplish a critical ‘core competency’ task such as weapons-system
maintenance . . . have left and gone home.”205
3. Lack of Accountability.—A second important set of practical
problems that has arisen in the current system of military contracting is a
lack of accountability for criminal behavior. PMF employees often escape
prosecution for criminal behavior in the war zones where they operate.206
Until recently, civilian military contractors could not be held accountable
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)207—the legal code
governing members of the U.S. Armed Forces—unless Congress had
formally declared war.208
Prosecuting PMF employees as civilians in federal criminal courts,
however, has proven problematic. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act (MEJA) extends federal jurisdiction over persons employed by or
accompanying the Armed Forces who engage in criminal conduct outside
of the United States.209 But several significant jurisdictional gaps remain.210
MEJA does not “cover non-felony offenses or offenses punishable by one
year or less; it only applies to those persons ‘supporting the mission of the
DOD’”—which means that contractors working on missions for other
agencies may fall outside of the scope of the Act—and it does not extend to
contractors working for the United States but paid through third-party
countries.211 Separately, federal courts could have jurisdiction over PMFs in
Iraq and Afghanistan through the War Crimes Act of 1996 (WCA).212 But
that statute is limited to “grave breach[es]” of the Geneva Conventions and
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its protocols,213 and to date no civilian contractor has been indicted under
the WCA.214
Further complicating the picture, if a private litigant managed to
establish jurisdiction in a federal civil court and get past the Government
Contractor Defense, many PMFs would still avoid accountability through
indemnification clauses in their contracts.215 A recent congressional inquiry
uncovered over 120 military contracts that included indemnity clauses
requiring the U.S. government to cover any liability incurred by PMFs
during performance of the contract.216 The taxpayer, therefore, would foot
the bill in many cases even if a PMF faced an adverse judgment.
Efforts to prosecute PMF employees often fare no better in foreign
jurisdictions. For example, the Coalition Provisional Authority, the interim
government that the United States established in Baghdad after invading
Iraq, issued an order shielding both U.S. forces and civilian contractors
from the jurisdiction of Iraqi national courts.217 Application of international
law is also prohibitively difficult. Although PMFs could conceivably be
prosecuted and otherwise regulated under treaties prohibiting mercenary
activity,218 the only broadly accepted definition of an illegal mercenary—the
one contained in the 1977 revision of Protocol I of the Geneva
Convention219—is construed so narrowly that most commentators have
concluded that it does not apply to PMFs.220 The prospect that new
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international law might be adopted to impose limitations on PMFs appears
unlikely.221 For example, the most recent attempt to revise the Protocol I
definition of mercenary is the International Convention Against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries,222 but no
member of the European Union or the G8 has ratified it.223
A lack of accountability for PMFs in the judicial system means that a
number of crimes, including horrific human rights abuses, have gone
unpunished. Perhaps most notorious are the incidents of prisoner abuse at
Abu Ghraib prison—which were perpetrated in part by employees of CACI
International—and the sex slave ring operated by employees of DynCorp in
Bosnia.224 In neither case did the contractors face any criminal charges in
either military or civilian courts.225 More recently, the Department of Justice
has seen its efforts to prosecute Blackwater employees for murder,
manslaughter, and weapons charges in federal courts fall apart under the
combined pressure of immunity deals and jurisdictional complications.226
Thus, PMFs often operate on a legal fault line that exists between the
various court systems that might hold them accountable. This situation has
left PMFs free in many cases to operate without the threat of legal
accountability.
As this Part demonstrates, the current system of regulating PMFs has
failed. Leaving PMFs in the Executive’s control violates separation of
powers and distorts the democratic decisionmaking process. Fundamental
flaws of oversight and accountability result in vast wasted resources,
confusion in the chain of command, and a failure to punish serious crimes.
Part IV suggests legislation by which Congress could assume control of
PMFs and address these problems.
III. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Congress could effectively regulate PMFs by applying aspects of the
existing system of military regulation. Effective regulation would have
three major components. First, in the field, PMFs would be subject to the
military chain of command. Integrating contractors into a clear command
structure would address the operational problems caused when lines of
authority are unclear between military officers and contractors who are on
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the same mission.227 It would also impose consequences on essential
contractors if they were to abandon their duties in the course of an
operation.
Second, PMFs should be subject to courts-martial jurisdiction under
the UCMJ. As the recent failure of prosecutions of Blackwater employees
in federal courts shows, the difficulties of prosecuting PMFs as civilians
may be insurmountable.228 Military courts, on the other hand, are
specifically designed to deal with the contingencies of prosecuting crimes
in the context of military activity.229
As noted above, Congress has already largely addressed this issue.230
Before 2006, civilians accompanying the military in a war zone could face
courts-martial jurisdiction only during a formally declared war. A 2006
amendment to the UCMJ extended the scope of courts-martial jurisdiction
over civilians “serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field”
beyond formal declarations of war to a “declared war or a contingency
operation.”231 On March 27, 2008, Alaa Mohammad Ali became the first
civilian contractor prosecuted in military court under the new law.232 Since
then, prosecutors have filed charges in military court against two more
civilian contractors.233 All three contractors have challenged the
constitutionality of the 2006 amendment.234 At the time of this writing, the
issue remains pending.
Whether the 2006 amendment is ultimately effective depends on
whether courts accept its constitutionality.235 A decision in favor of
broadened jurisdiction for courts martial would not be unprecedented. In
1956 in United States v. Burney, the Court of Military Appeals reasoned
that civilians accompanying the military should be subject to courts-martial
jurisdiction when they “receive benefits and protection from the military
arm while performing their tasks, and their efforts are essential to the
accomplishment of the military mission. The security of the nation may
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depend on their activities, and they should answer to their immediate
protector for any transgressions.”236
Thus, the Burney court recognized that extending courts-martial
jurisdiction over civilians whose duties were essential to the success of the
military was crucial for the proper functioning of the armed forces. That
rationale is even more persuasive today, given how much more prevalent
contractors have become in the military. However, the Burney court’s
application of courts-martial jurisdiction to civilians outside of declared
wars was foreclosed in 1970 in United States v. Avrette.237 That case
overturned a great deal of precedent and read the phrase “in time of war” to
limit courts-martial jurisdiction over citizens to actions stemming from
formally declared wars.238 Courts should uphold the 2006 amendment on the
basis of the Burney rationale, particularly given that PMFs and the military
are so closely integrated today that they are functionally indistinguishable.
Finally, Congress should insist on access to full information about
PMFs. While enforcing compliance from the Executive may prove difficult,
Congress could use its power of the purse to attach conditions to funds used
for private contracts. For example, they could refuse funding for companies
that wish to withhold proprietary information. Congress has begun to take
steps in this direction as well, though not nearly to the extent necessary. The
War Funding Accountability Act, for example, would require the President
to submit a report to Congress “in the case of a contract entered into by the
United States relating to military operations in Iraq or the reconstruction of
Iraq” providing “the name of the contractor and a description of the process
by which the contract was awarded; the amount of the contract; and the date
on which work under the contract is to begin.”239 The Stop Outsourcing
Security Act would also impose stringent reporting requirements on the
President as well as give congressional committees access to a copy of each
contract issued in excess of $5 million.240 These bills would substantially
improve Congress’s ability to exercise its oversight responsibilities over
PMFs operating with the U.S. military, but to date, neither has passed.241
236

6 C.M.A. 776, 788 (1956).
19 C.M.A. 363, 365–66 (1970).
238
See United States v. Grossman, 42 C.M.R. 529, 530 (1970) (“As far back as the Indian Wars,
court-martial jurisdiction has been exercised over civilians serving with the armies in the field during
hostilities which were not formally declared wars.”); see also Peters, supra note 213, at 399 (“The
conclusion of Averette that civilians are subject to courts-martial jurisdiction only during periods of
congressionally declared war has little logical support and virtually no support in national historic
practice.”).
239
H.R. 714, 110th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(A)–(C) (2007).
240
S. 3023, 111th Cong. § 6 (2010).
241
Both bills died in committee. For a procedural history of the bills, see H.R. 714: War Funding
Accountability Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-714 (last visited
Feb. 20, 2012), and S. 3023: Stop Outsourcing Security Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-3023 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). The Stop Outsourcing Security Act was
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CONCLUSION
Congress’s role in regulating the armed forces is fundamental to the
constitutional system of separation of powers over military affairs. The
history of mercenary use in standing armies during the era of the American
Revolution shows that the Framers understood that the nation’s armed
forces could comprise various types of military professionals other than
enlisted citizens. They agreed to accept a standing army solely on the
condition that it be regulated by Congress.
Thus far, Congress has left PMFs almost entirely under the control of
the Executive. Yet PMFs as they currently operate in contemporary military
conflicts fall squarely within the Framers’ broad definition of a standing
army. The regulation of PMFs is therefore a crucial part of the Congress’s
authority over the military. By failing to assert control over PMFs,
Congress is neglecting an important aspect of its institutional role. This
situation has led to serious problems, both on a systemic level of
constitutional governance and on a practical level of effective military
management. If Congress continues to abdicate its responsibility in this
matter, it will be creating precisely the type of situation that the Framers
hoped to avoid when they debated how the new nation would secure its
liberty without slipping into tyranny.

reintroduced in the 112th Congress as S. 1428, and has been referred to committee. See S. 1428: Stop
Outsourcing Security Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s112-1428
(last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
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